GenEI Blog Series
- Author: Rishya Dharmani
The world is witnessing the waxing and waning hegemonic turf war between the United States (US) and China. After the G20 Busan Summit, there are significant tailwinds for a G2 rapprochement, but structural misalignment makes it near-impossible that this will occur any time soon. The rupture of the liberal world order has long been foretold.
A more apt categorisation would be a strategic shift towards “re-globalizing, re-balancing and multi-polarity”, as remarked by External Affairs Minister (EAM) Dr. S. Jaishankar at the Rome Mediterranean Dialogue in 2024. This is the era of dialogue and diplomacy, and not of war and alliances. A Europe–India caucus is a natural answer due to their political and economic alignment: it can be a guiding force to check China’s export bans and territorial and maritime aggression.
In September 2025, the Strategic EU–India Agenda unveiled five cornerstones of cooperation in technology, sustainable prosperity, defence, connectivity, and global issues, with enablers across them. A new momentum in ties is building. The recent transatlantic tensions are aiding this Indo–Euro embrace. It has opened opportunities and challenges for India and the different entities within Europe to push for constructive partnerships. Such an approach could transcend the loaded Cold War categories of North-South. It can inform radical cooperative arrangements in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous world.
Before Washington’s re-evaluation of its role in global affairs, India’s rapport with Europe was primarily confined to its dominant Western core. The other “Europes” were mostly seen as the Soviet satellites or countries struggling to integrate into the Washington Consensus. This type of engagement predictably bore poor fruit as the British–Franco–German lens remained bound by transatlantic considerations – specifically the mood of the American presidency at any given time.
Shadows of the past
India’s post-independence engagement with the Global North was foreshadowed by the country’s prior reservations on the capitalist vs communist divide. Europe was seen as the site of this Cold War confrontation. India’s foundational foreign policy of non-alignment, professed by the post-independence leadership, continues to this day. This is echoed in the current calls for multialignment by EAM Jaishankar.
Europe was divided by the Iron Curtain, and it was only the demise of the Soviet bloc that opened up Indian and European worldviews as they were “freed” by bipolar Cold War politics. Now, a second tumultuous change with the reordering of the global balance of power is underway – one which allows Europe and India to reimagine the contours of engagement. Such imaginative policies addressing contemporary challenges can provide a much-needed momentum to India–Europe ties.
Beyond India–EU relations: a new template for India and the Eurosphere
The EU College of Commissioners’ visit to India at the start of 2025, and the signing of the India–EU Strategic Partnership, signalled broader ambitions for the partnership. However, the long, drawn-out negotiations on the India–EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) imply that large multilateral approaches may not be considered beneficial. The atmosphere is heated by the weaponisation of tariffs; multilateral arrangements are seen to be inconvenient and unwieldy. The recent US–China trade truce is illustrative of this new normal, where mutual hostility is merely tempered, unlike long-term and bona fide arrangements like the World Trade Organization (WTO).
India and European partners are outflanking this protectionism by structuring partnerships and visibility beyond the conventional stranglehold of the Eurosphere. India and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) have signed a Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA), which provides a binding $100 billion investment in India, and gives Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein access to the growing Indian market – a plurilateral win-win. Since the Marshall Plan, Western European countries had capitalised on their relations with the US and enjoyed near synonymity with the term “Europe”. The struggling transatlantic alliance and war in Ukraine have weakened these countries’ influence in European affairs.
The European “frontier” is also becoming important due to the migration crisis, intensified by the recently concluded Israel–Hamas war, and the opening of the Arctic trade route due to rising temperatures. The ensuing debates reflect that Europe is not a monolithic entity, as political and economic divisions come to the forefront. While the “Russian threat” has granted it a political rallying cry, the long-term survival of this supranational model can only come by recognising the diversity that exists within the Eurosphere. For India, European countries are friendly partners in its mandala (international circle), but not a homogenous entity. As a middle power, it is de-hyphenating Europe with its western core and acknowledging intra-European identities.
India and European subregionalism
India has stepped up its intra-European interactions, particularly with Northern and Central regions. Geopolitical tensions also reached the Baltic states, as they grew wary of China after tensions with Lithuania boiled over due to the opening of the Taiwanese Representative Office in July 2021; cyber attacks, and China’s solidarity with Russia’s goals in Ukraine have similarly contributed to worsening relations. In contrast, India and the Nordic states share the goal of cooperation in Artificial Intelligence (AI), biotechnology, and clean energy. Being pioneers in these frontier technologies, the India–Nordic Summits have provided opportunities such as the Nordic contribution to India’s Smart Cities programme.
Former PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee once commented that “one can choose their friends but not neighbours.” But diplomacy in the 21st century and after the pandemic is not geographically constrained. India’s Associate Observer status in the Iberian–American Summits has simultaneously reinforced its Latin American outreach, given the ethnic connection between these two distant regions. Current global churn offers middle powers the freedom to align according to their will and defray the costs of an alliance.
Europe, too, has looked beyond its neighbourhood. Norway’s “India Strategy” signals that European consciousness has graduated India from a donee to a partner. Poland’s 2024 “Strategy towards Non-European Developing Countries” considered diplomatic forays into Asia, Latin America, and Africa. As the locus of the global economy shifted to the Indo-Pacific, the burgeoning export-oriented economies of China and the Asian Tigers were seen as lucrative partners. Post-pandemic, the Central & Eastern European (CEE) countries and Visegrad 4 (V4) have also reoriented their Asian vision. Looking beyond China and the Southeast Asian economies, they are considering India as a viable partner. The “Go India” campaign (2015) for Polish businessmen is a case in point.
Pursuing regional European outreach, EAM Jaishankar unfolded India’s Mediterranean vision “linking the Atlantic with the Indo-Pacific” at the CII India Mediterranean Business Conclave. Central to this vision, the flagship India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) aims to build supply chain resilience. India’s annual trade with the region is nearing $80 billion, with a diaspora of 460,000 and mutual stakes in energy, defence, water technology, fertilisers, etc. Several co-development projects in transport, communications, and clean energy are also in progress. Beyond the trade and transactional maritime relations, India is investing in important partnerships. An example is Prime Minister Modi’s visit, during which he affirmed India’s support for Cyprus against the Turkish threat.
Economic ties and the geopolitical lens
Trade imbalances have persuaded the CEE to consider non-exploitative economic ties. The Confederation of Indian Industry’s India Europe Business and Sustainability Conclave is a result of this push. Centrality in the Indo-Pacific, strong macro-economic fundamentals, and democratic stability have put India on the map. The Czech Republic and India’s Strategic Partnership (2024) has opened up opportunities in the academic, AI, finance, metallurgy, and automobile sectors. Dignitaries from the EU, Slovakia and Hungary have attended the Raisina Dialogue, the premier event in Indian foreign policy circles. The engagement is not merely symbolic, as there is an extensive presence of Indian IT majors like Infosys, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), and other business groups in this region.
Beyond the traditional arrangements, newer collaborative templates are offered through decentralised diplomacy. For instance, a Memorandum of Understanding on ICT, cybersecurity between Estonia and the state of Telangana was signed in 2025. Another mechanism is the sister city programme between Delhi-Leuven, and Diu-Loures, which enables the sharing of best governance practices. After the outbreak of war in Ukraine, Indian students in Russian universities found shelter in Poland and Slovakia – signalling practical fruits of bilateral ties.
Ways forward
Neither Europe nor India has global hegemonic aspirations. The EU may grudgingly tolerate India’s oil purchases from Russia, but the existential security issues of Central and Eastern Europe in the face of Russian aggression cannot be addressed by such “fence-sitting”. Will India’s policy of not choosing any sides lead it to isolation?
Observers remain divided on American power potential, especially after irreparable reputational damage by the second Trump Administration. And yet, China has been striving to best American hegemony at a breakneck speed since the 1980s. Even in Europe, Chinese ambitions and investment far outstrip Indian efforts. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and plurilateral mechanisms like the China–CEE Cooperation format (14+1) are a protracted vision to unfold a new world order. This is a serious challenge to India’s goals of building long-standing, mutually beneficial institutionalised cooperation with the only standing international “liberal” pole.
The volatility and collapse of international governance norms may offer Europe and India an opportunity to act as two stable pillars. As India’s economy and foreign policy turn globalist in their aspirations, enhanced contact with European partners would be beneficial. Multitrack diplomacy recognises growing educational, tourist, entrepreneurial, and cultural connections.
Emerging trends include defence exports to Cyprus, Southern Caucasus countries at the European periphery; educational contacts with Indian students pursuing professional courses in European universities (especially in central and eastern Europe); and lastly, a futuristic partnership in climate change research (e.g., India’s Himadri station in Norway). Apart from these specific arrangements, regional connectivity projects such as the IMEC or the International North-South Transport Corridor greatly enlarge India–Europe interactions with neighbouring Asian and African regions.
An EU–India relationship may be too complex and unwieldy to navigate. However, plurilateral and even extrastate relations (between corporations, cities, non-profit organisations) could be necessary. The “low politics” concerns about climate change, poor SDG performance, and zoonotic disease outbreaks are not “serious enough” for those engaged in a superpower battle. But Europe’s climate focus (e.g., CBAM) and India’s leadership in the Global South can provide a logical site for decisive actions that may yet secure humanity’s survival. For India, Europe’s regions should not be reduced to “gateways” but seen as “lighthouses” for bilateral and multilateral lattices. Together, they can help build a rules-based order.
Rishya Dharmani is a doctoral candidate at Panjab University and has contributed in research roles in different organisations. Her PhD thesis investigates India as a civilisational state articulating unique indigenous geopolitical and geoeconomic perspectives, while aspiring for a leading power status. Rishya is interested in decoloniality, Indic strategic traditions, developmental public policy and polarity politics. She is an aspiring academic-practioner and a volunteer in the social sector. As a Geopolitical Intelligence Analyst, she acquiredin risk industry relevant skills, and contributed to online media portals and research seminars.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of their affiliated institutions or those of Generation EU-India. The authors write in their personal capacity.
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