Outcomes of the 16th EU-India Summit
- Dimitrios L. Margellos coordinated and led the drafting of the article
- With contributions from Manisha Bieber, Avtansh Behal, Aditi Mukund, Matias Diaz, Patrizia Cogo, and Aahil Sheikh
The headlines in the aftermath of the 16th EU-India Summit have focused on the landmark Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which seeks to eliminate and reduce tariffs on 96.6% of EU goods exports and 99.5% of Indian goods. In the Summit’s outcomes, GenEI sees something deeper: a layered architecture spanning trade, security, mobility, and the climate, designed to deliver immediate benefits while deferring disagreements. This architecture is a result of prolonged and difficult negotiations, culminating in a mutual realisation that the two sides could no longer afford to waste any more time.
Amidst a flurry of disruptive economic policy decisions from the Trump administration, the EU and India have amped up efforts to strengthen their global partnerships in a bid for stability. Crucially, what began as an effort to future-proof supply chains from Chinese dominance, quickly evolved into a barricade against American coercion. To be sure, the economic dimension is vital and the driving factor in such deals – but the strength of this relationship lies in the interlocking commitments across different sectors. The success of the EU–India relationship in the long-term will depend precisely upon the ability of both sides to move beyond economic rationale and create mutually-beneficial competitive advantages in a variety of sectors.
Each component of this architecture is worth scrutinising, beginning with the FTA.
What is included in the FTA and what is left out
The FTA itself is a massive step towards resilience – potentially the first expression of a new trade world order. The resonance of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s remarks at Davos hints at such a divided world trade order: one where middle powers band together as great ones weaponise their economic might.
The “mother of all deals” is an extensive agreement covering multiple sectors, but it is not comprehensive by design. The European (primarily German) car industry will now enjoy a gradual but dramatic drop in tariffs on cars from 110% to as low as 10%, up to 250,000 exports a year. Applicable to cars priced above €15,000 (INR 16.44 lakhs), this will most likely impact the mid-tier luxury car segment, allowing German automakers such as BMW, Audi and Mercedes to compete better with Indian and Korean manufacturers. The reduction in tariffs could also allow European manufacturers to target the Indian market to experiment with more niche products – such as the VW Beetle and the Fiat 500 – which existing tariffs rendered too expensive to sell in India.
Despite these changes, India is unlikely to benefit from Europe’s growing adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) – EVs have been excluded from this tariff relaxation for five years, protecting Indian EV leaders such as Tata and Mahindra. Another benefit to Indian carmakers is expanded access to the European car market: reduced tariffs will be in force for up to 625,000 exports a year. This imbalance in quotas on both sides has been justified by the larger size of the European market, with 10 million sales last year compared to India’s 4 million.
Tariffs on machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and agri-food products such as wine (150% to 75%) or olive oil (45% to 0%) will also be reduced or eliminated. This focus on cars, wines and agri-food products, along with corresponding reductions in aviation tariffs, reflects India’s close ties with three historic EU partners – Germany, France and Italy – who will stand to benefit the most.
The FTA additionally reveals an impressive degree of pragmatism from both sides. For the Europeans, the nightmarish roadblocks in the 11th hour of the signing of the Mercosur deal hurt their credibility, with Member States like France showing little to no appetite for exposing their agricultural industry to global competition. For India, liberalisation is a historic step and could potentially undermine key initiatives like “Make in India”, if not managed correctly. Such concerns could once more have spelled the end of the negotiations – but they evidently did not. In the words of European Commissioner for Trade Maroš Šefčovič, “We decided to keep the most sensitive sectors for both of us outside of this deal so we can really focus on the positive outcome.”
To some, an FTA with quota-based liberalisation may not be deserving of such a title. But a new world order necessitates that countries seeking to maintain any semblance of norms and law must act decisively. India, a country with a GDP per capita of just under US$3,000 (2024) has ended up on the receiving end of a higher effective tariff rate than China, the chief adversary of the United States (US). There are many reasons to be sceptical about “unfinished business”, but this agreement is undeniable proof that middle powers possess the means to resist coercion, and to pursue their own interests cooperatively.
Less visible but not insignificant are the Agreement’s gender provisions. The FTA includes limited gender-related provisions under its Trade and Sustainable Development pillar, reaffirming commitments to the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) core labour standards such as non-discrimination and equal remuneration, as well as promoting women’s participation in trade through cooperation and dialogue. There are significant economic benefits to gender inclusion in trade. True inclusivity, in practice, must prioritise gender as a cross-cutting lens.
Beyond the FTA, GenEI notes three areas of particular interest, explored below.
Topic in focus: Security
For all its significance, the FTA was just one of three main outcomes of the 16th EU-India Summit. The Security and Defence Partnership, for its part, is a significant departure from the status quo and seeks to embed the EU into the Indo-Pacific security architecture. HR/VP Kaja Kallas noted the ways that this partnership is underpinned by similar worldviews, stating that “The EU and India see the world changing in similar ways and are responding together. Security is now a core part of our relationship.” The EU has historically been absent from the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, even as individual Member States, such as Germany, have recently made strides in integrating themselves in a space dominated by great powers.
This move reaffirms the fact that the EU sees India as a core pillar of stability in an emerging world order defined by shaky foundations, and the two sides share an understanding that security now extends beyond the traditional sectors of this space. It is noteworthy that the defence cooperation spans sectors like cybersecurity, protection of critical infrastructure, space security, as well as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other disruptive technologies, opening up critical areas for cooperation. India has thus far proven to be a reliable partner for maritime security efforts – for example through its cooperation in the EUNAVFOR Atalanta mission – while the focus on technology indicates an appetite to diversify from dependence on the US.
Topic in focus: Mobility & Research
An uncapped mobility agreement for skilled Indian workers and students to come to Europe also flew under the radar – but is a much-needed addition in the EU’s policy arsenal against demographic decline. While traditional destinations are erecting barriers for skilled migrants (the US has so far lost more than 10,000 STEM PhDs during the second Trump term), the EU is taking a nuanced, long-term view of things.
The section on skills mobility in the “Towards 2030: A joint European Union-India Comprehensive Strategic Agenda” is of particular relevance to skilled migrants, early-career professionals, and students alike. As a youth-led EU–India network, GenEI strongly welcomes the emphasis on strengthening mobility exchanges for EU and Indian students, academics, and researchers through instruments such as the Erasmus+, Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Programmes, the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA), alongside Indian funding mechanisms such as the Scheme for Promotion of Academic and Research Collaboration (SPARC).
GenEI also welcomes the intention to strengthen EU students’ access to India’s mobility, scholarship, and education programmes. This commitment should be understood as a call to raise awareness, create the structural foundation, and actively encourage European students to engage academically with India, much like Indian students have done with Europe. At the moment, the infrastructure is lacking, as evidenced by the fact that Germany’s Federal Statistical Office does not even report on the numbers of German students in India due to their numbers being below statistical thresholds. This signals an important shift that youth mobility between the EU and India should no longer be incidental or mono-directional, but instead intentional, reciprocal, and structurally supported.
These measures are a clear win for EU–India research cooperation, which would extend beyond technological and scientific collaboration to include diplomacy, trade, and people-to-people relations. Expanding such research ecosystems and funding programs for exchanges involving students, vocational trainees, and young professionals is critical to building sustainable bilateral ties.
Finally, the decision to launch a EU Legal Gateway Office in India – complemented by the EU Talent Pool pilot (November 2025) and the adoption by the Commission of its first ever Visa Strategy – is perhaps the most tangible development in mobility. As GenEI has previously highlighted, a one-stop shop for information, guidance, and application processes has long been requested by students, skilled professionals, and employers alike. A centralised, regularly-updated platform, and a physical office that reduces fragmentation of information across overlapping national and sub-national systems represent a significant step forward.
Though there is no indication as to its location, GenEI would propose that the office be situated away from traditional political epicenters like Delhi or Brussels, and strongly encourages the establishment of the Legal Gateway Office in South India, ideally in Bengaluru. Such a location would reflect both the sectoral priority of IT talent mobility and offer geographical inclusivity.
Topic in focus: Climate
On climate and energy, the FTA establishes a substantive but cautious starting point. Both sides commit to implementing key Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), which they have ratified. These include the Paris Agreement, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).
The EU and India are also seeking to expand cooperation on renewable energy, emissions reduction in the maritime sector, and the sustainable management of natural resources, including forests and marine ecosystems. Additionally, there are dedicated provisions on biodiversity conservation, combating illegal logging, wildlife trafficking, and IUU fishing, alongside reduced tariffs and services liberalisation for low-carbon goods and technologies, and lower barriers to green trade and investment.
The €500 million climate cooperation fund, disbursed over the coming two years – akin to GenEI’s proposal that the EU establish a dedicated Green Transition Fund for India – is a step in the right direction. However, as in the case of agri-food tariffs, a number of sensitive topics have been sidestepped for now, among them the application of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to Indian exports – a major sticking point between the two parties in prior negotiations.
Until decisions are taken on these topics in future talks, the aforementioned commitments remain largely facilitative and not fully transformative, despite a clear desire to support the green transition and global environmental governance. This is an important distinction, as India is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change. Ambition and strong implementation are necessary to move the needle on climate action.
Ways forward
The US has accelerated the fragmentation of the liberal international order and created a perception that nations must submit to great powers’ whims or suffer. But the EU and India have rushed to secure agreements and safeguard their economies and, by extension, the rules-based order itself.
GenEI views the agreement as a turning point rather than a finish line. The FTA, 20 years in the making, was not available to previous generations of young Indians and Europeans. It is available to us. The next generation of Indians and Europeans will reap the benefits of these agreements for years to come.
While acknowledging the decades of effort that have gone into making this moment a reality, some questions do remain unresolved: the full details of the deal are yet unknown, and the ratification of the deal in the European Parliament is likely to take some time. But the opportunities ahead are undeniable.
The work for the youth begins now. For a generation whose worldview is categorically shaped by the unknown space between a fading and an emerging world order, the EU–India relationship offers a rare glimpse into the ability of democracies to strengthen peace and create mutual benefit amidst chaos. The two sides have chosen each other, and it is time for the youth to follow suit.
Disclaimer:
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their affiliated institutions. The authors write in their personal capacity.
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